

**Nigeria Economic Development through Vision 20:2020
The Challenges of Infrastructural Development**

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Abstract

This study examined Vision 20:2020 and the Challenges of Infrastructural Development in Nigeria. Although Nigeria's economic potential is well recognised as it is regarded as the biggest economy in the West African sub region. But the series of national development plans have failed to yield the desired minimum level of success required. This study critically examined past literature and identified the need to use survey research design method as a result of the short comings in government agencies data as observed in literature. Two hundred and fifty (250) questionnaires were administered to respondents randomly within the Lagos metropolitan area, since the state constitute about 11% of the nation's population (LASG Press 2011), with 220 valid questionnaires retrieved from the respondents, reflecting a valid response rate of 88%, of the questionnaires being returned for analysis. The respondents were selected using convenience sampling technique. The questionnaire for this study was validated using face and content validity. Regression and correlation analyses were used to test the stated hypotheses with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The findings show clearly the possibility of a distortion if secondary data generated are used in issues of this nature, as there is no relationship between government stated investment on infrastructural development and observed infrastructure on ground. It is also revealed that, there is a correlation between state of infrastructure on ground and the realization of Nigeria Vision 20:2020. Based on these findings, it was concluded that with the current level of corruption, the possibility of government officials to implement and enforce strategic policy on infrastructural development stated in the plan may endanger the entire developmental plan.

Keywords: Vision, Economy, Infrastructure, Development, Planning, Policy

Introduction

In every system there is a high probability of conflicting and competing interests, needs and expectations. There are also resources, such as human (skills), material (assets), and services available to address these expectations. The challenge for a good government is to identify and prioritise through adequate planning techniques which of these needs or gaps should be addressed, what assets should be strengthened and mobilised, who will be responsible, what will it cost, and where the resources will come from.

Thus there is a need for a government developmental plan. This is a tool for the attainment of high standard of living, higher value level of science and technological development such that its citizens would derive natural attachment to an innovative environment or system, and invariably sustenance and growth of the nation. A development plan could also be an aspect of a country planning, which set out the local authority's policies and proposals for the development and use of resources both within the short, medium and long time horizons (Adeboasah, 2004; Ukertor, 2012). It contains a number of documents of structured plans which set out key strategic policies as a framework for local planning and set out more detailed policies to guide development in the areas.

Nigeria's economic potential is well recognised as it is regarded as the biggest economy in the West African sub region (Ebohon & Obakhedo (2012). Given the country's considerable resource endowment and coastal location, the possibility of growth is strong, but very little of this potential has been realised. A large majority of the population live in a state of poverty. The problem of urban population, rural stagnation, unemployment and growing inequalities continue to plague Nigeria. Hopes of accelerated development are difficult to realize. This gloomy situation is of great concern to stakeholders and the concerned citizenry. Nigeria has not been able to achieve meaningful development in spite of her huge resources endowment. This has greatly affected her quest to improve the quality of life of her citizens (Lawal and Oluwatoyin, 2011).

Previous efforts at planning and visioning were not sustained both during the pre and post colonial era. 'The first known development plan; 1946-55 Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare-with plan revisions, 1951-55) and the 1955-60 plan (later extended to 1962), were initiated by colonial administrators' (Umoru, 2011). In the post colonial era, the First National Development Plan, 1962-1968, developed to put the economy on a fast growth path. The plan gave adequate priority to agriculture and industrial development as well as training of high-level and intermediate manpower. The Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974, launched mainly to reconstruct and rehabilitate infrastructure that had been damaged during the civil war, while the Third National Development Plan, 1975-1980, and the Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-1985 etc.

There were some other developmental plan like Fifth National Development Plan that was to run in 1988-92 with the World Bank-IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was implemented in 1986-92 etc.

In 2004 the government's economic agenda was formally launched and tagged the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (Sanusi, 2010)".

These plans, if well harnessed and utilised, are capable of transforming the economy among the industrialised economies of the world in no distant future. Unfortunately, Nigeria failed to realise this potential (Ayodele, Obafemi, and Ebong, 2013).

But according to Ibieta and Ekhohe, (2013), development planning in Nigeria has series of suffered setback because, critical task which ought to draw input from critical sectors are in the bad state of social and physical infrastructure. Osabuohien Efobi and Salami (2012) in their study underscores the need for Nigeria to pursue the improvement that will provide supportive role to planning as any planning void of adequate 'pillars' will not deliver the expected development outcomes irrespective of the coverage and how well nuanced. Thus, it is not that Nigeria planned to fail nor failed to plan but the critical factor of infrastructural development associated with the planning models is weak. The workability of any developmental plan and economic growth hinged on a globally competitive manufacturing sector that requires a robust infrastructural development Olaseni and Alade (2012). Thus, the inability of both the past and present government in Nigeria to develop and implement adequate policies on infrastructural development could be one of the major factors that made most of the past developmental plans to fail.

This study then noted that in a country where over ninety percent of the corporate institutions and over forty percent of individual now resort to meeting their own infrastructural needs as identified by Uhunmwangho, (2012) the government has fail the populace and is likely to make the same error of past developmental plan.

Vision 2020 started in 2004 when Goldman Sach said that Nigeria will emerge one of the 20 largest economies of the world in 2025. This was the basis upon which Nigeria's vision 2020 by the past administration of President Obasanjo was built. According to Obasanjo, 2020 was too far and could be fast tracked to 20:2020 (Gabriel, 2012). This vision was pursued by Yar Adua administration using the 7 point agenda, and the present administration has made it a focal point of its administration.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 What is Nigeria Vision 20:2020?

The Vision 20:2020 (NV20:2020) is Nigeria's long term development goal designed to propel the country to the league of the top 20 economies of the world by 2020. The attainment of the Vision would enable the country achieve a high standard of living for its citizens. NV20:2020 was developed by Nigerians for the Nigerian people and involved a process of thorough engagement with all stakeholders across all levels of government and society. Vision is therefore, a rallying point for all Nigerians, regardless of ethnicity, political affiliation, economic status, or religion behind a common cause of placing the country on a sustainable development path and transformation into a modern society better able to play a greater role in the comity of nations (Nigeria Vision 20: 2020 Abridged Version, 2012).

2.2 Brief History on the Development of NV20:2020 Planning

As identified earlier Nigeria has had a relatively long experience in development planning beginning with the Colonial Development Plan (1946-1960). Fixed medium-term development plans and National Rolling Plans were also developed and implemented with various objectives. Other strategic efforts such as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), the strategy for attaining the 20:2020

ment Goals (MDGs) and the 7-Point Agenda were not effectively implemented, and recorded modest success. Weak implementation of these strategic development has constrained the country's growth and development. Another reason for achievement and failures of past development plan was lack of political will to see the development strategy through to the end. Nigeria has, therefore, adopted a long term approach to development planning and set for itself the goal of being among the 20 largest economies of the world by 2020. This is why it has chosen the following vision Statement:

"By 2020, Nigeria will have a large, strong, diversified, sustainable and competitive economy that effectively harnesses the talents and energies of its people and responsibly exploits its natural endowments to guarantee a high standard of living and quality of life to its citizens".

In the context of globalization and the increasing relevance of Nigeria as a leading emerging economy, the need for total transformation of Nigeria through long-term development strategies has become compelling. Vision 20:2020 is important for the following reasons:

- To plan development on a long-term basis in order to achieve structural transformation;
- To reduce the country's overdependence on oil;
- To effectively transform the lives of Nigerians in terms of significant improvements in their standards of living; and
- For the country to take its rightful position among the nations of the world.

According to Olaseni and Alade (2012), the aspirations of NV20:2020 are defined across four dimensions:

Social Dimension: A peaceful, equitable, harmonious and just society, where every citizen has a strong sense of national identity and citizens are supported by an educational and healthcare system that caters for all, and sustains a life expectancy of not less than 70 years;

Economic Dimension: A globally competitive economy that is resilient and diversified with a globally competitive manufacturing sector that is tightly integrated and contributes no less than 25% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP);

Institutional Dimension: A stable and functional democracy where the rights of the citizens to determine their leaders are guaranteed and adequate infrastructure exists to support a market-friendly and globally competitive business environment and

Environmental Dimension: A level of environmental consciousness that enables and

supports sustainable management of the nation's God-given natural endowments to ensure their preservation for the benefit of present and future generations (NPC, 2009).

The perception worth noting is that a national development plan is anchored on infrastructure, socio-economic, political, and innovation technological capability. It is also worth noting that opinions among scholars and decision makers on how infrastructure and other factors affect development differ. In the next section, efforts will be made to lay a foundation on the link between infrastructure and the possibility of a success in the economic development plan of NV20:2020.

2.3 Infrastructural Development and NV20:2020

Precisely, infrastructure refers to a network of transport, communication and public (social) services - all functioning as a system or as a set of interrelated and mutually beneficial services provided for the improvement of the general well-being of the population (Ogburn, 1997). Infrastructure also refers to the fundamental facilities and systems serving a country, city, or area, including the services and facilities necessary for its economy to function (Sullivan and Steven, 2003). It typically characterises technical structures such as roads, bridges, tunnels, water supply, sewers, electrical grids, telecommunications, and so forth, and can be defined as "the physical components of interrelated systems providing commodities and services essential to enable, sustain, or enhance societal living conditions (Fulmer, 2009).

Public or social infrastructural services refer to those services or facilities meant for the common goods of the people. They include water supply, health care delivery, education, postal and telecommunication facilities, electricity, etc. Sufficient infrastructural services are indispensable for economic development.

Infrastructural development plays a key role in the economic stability of any system or community (Ajalenkoko, 2008). It is a broad concept that embraces public investment in physical assets and social services. Olaseni and Alade (2012), theoretically identify three schools of thought on the effectiveness of investment in infrastructure as a poverty reduction strategy. The first school argues that investment in social infrastructure, which embraces investment in education and health, is more relevant to the goal of poverty reduction than physical infrastructure (Jerome & Ariyo, 2004; Jahan & McCleery, 2005). The second school maintains that investment in both physical and social infrastructure reduce poverty. The last school holds that investment in infrastructure in general has no effect on poverty reduction.

The main protagonists of the third view base their theoretical position on two arguments. First, there is the presumption that though investment in infrastructure is important for economic growth, it has little relevance to poverty reduction. Second, it has been argued that actual benefits from infrastructure have been significantly lower than anticipated. There is also a view that developing countries are characterized by weak governance and institutions, the tendency for government officials to be corrupt is very high, and in this scenario decisions to invest in infrastructure may be distorted, thereby lowering the contribution of infrastructure to growth and diverting benefits intended for the poor (Ali & Pernia, 2003).

However, despite the above views, there is now a wider recognition that if governance and institutional frameworks are strengthened, the linkage between improved infrastructure and poverty reduction can also become stronger (Olaseni and Alade, 2012). The World Bank

states that for every one percent investment on infrastructure, there is an equivalent GDP by one percent in that nation (Ajanlekoko, 2008). Though two years after Vision 20, Nigeria made great strides and achievement in every aspect of national life, but however, the state of the public utility and infrastructural development is very poor. Nigeria is a country that is regarded as the sixth largest producer of oil and gas (Ugwu, 2012). This is observed in every sector of the society like the power sector, road transport network, water supply system etc.

The adequacy of infrastructure helps to determine a country's success or failure in economic production, coping with population growth, reducing poverty, improving environmental quality, etc. Thus there is no developed country today that does not have adequate physical infrastructure and public utility and service. The constant improvement and investment in physical infrastructure and public utility and service further improves their GDP, while in underdeveloped countries observed in many African countries like Nigeria, the infrastructural development is very weak, and this is reflected in the GDP and per capital income.

Based on the above theoretical observations, the question then is:

How can Nigeria be on course, with her level of investment on infrastructural development to make Vision 2020 affect the economy positively and meet its stated objectives?

Research Methods and Analysis

Though, it would have been appropriate to use data from organisations like the Federal Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria and other relevant agencies to determine the investment on infrastructural development, the level of corruption in Nigeria has made this inadequate (Ali & Olaniran, 2013). Also as pointed out by the former Central Bank Governor, Soludo (2012), that the most important national data (if they are available and on time) are either of poor quality or downright wrong. Soludo, (2012) then asked, if Nigerians, believe that Nigeria's population is 167 million this year (2012); believe that GDP is growing at nearly 8 per cent (led by the services sector) and at the same time poverty has worsened to all time high of 72 per cent and the inflation figure make sense; believe in the data on consumption, investment, etc. It is very hard to press how unreliable the data could be, when Soludo (2012) point out that Nigerian government officials from National Planning Commission repeatedly refer to World Bank data in the Vision 2020 document rather than estimate from relevant agencies in Nigeria. Records from the federal ministry of works show that 2.3 billion naira was invested on infrastructure construction 2001 by the federal government in Nasarawa state. But it was discovered years later that the contractors abandon the project (Jimoh & Onochie, 2012). This is also reflected in records from the government agency would not reflect the effective investment on infrastructure in Nasarawa state within the identified period. The Obasanjo administration claimed that it had invested about 8 billion dollars on the national integrated power project, to generate 10,000 MW to the national grid by 2010. Subsequent administrations were expected to build on this to reach 20,000MW by 2015 (Anayo O., et al. 2012). But this also did not reflect on the reality of the situation in Nigeria as at today.

Based on the observations identified of consultants and researchers like Soludo (2012), this study adopted survey research design to rather than data from government agencies to examine the challenges raised in the study.

It should also be noted that, since the study is set to determine the reality of how the government effort on NV20:2020 would be affecting the economy of the nation positively and realizing its stated objectives, the observation above shows the need for the use of primary data as observed by Nigerians.

Thus, from the question raise earlier in this study, two hypotheses were developed and tested, using inferential statistical tool. Other can be seen in the table in appendix 2.
H1: There is a relationship between government stated investment on infrastructural development and observed infrastructure on ground

3.1 Sample and data analysis

The research design chosen for this study as stated earlier was survey research design. This is because it attempts to investigate the relationship between government stated investment on infrastructural development and observed infrastructure on ground via an inferential statistical tool. In the study a total of 250 questionnaires were distributed to respondents randomly within Lagos metropolitan area, since the state constitute about 11% of the nation's population (Lagos State Press, 2011), with 220 valid questionnaires retrieved from the respondents, reflecting a response rate of 88%, of the questionnaires being returned for analysis.

Correlation

State of Infrastructure	Pearson Correlation	1	.355
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.445
	N	4	4
Invest on Infrastructure	Pearson Correlation	.355	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.445	
	N	4	4

The value of 0.355 in the model summary representing the correlation coefficient between investment on physical infrastructure and state of infrastructure on ground revealed that there is no correlation between investment on physical infrastructure and state of infrastructure on ground.

A two tail test was used because the hypothesis was not directional at 0.01 level of significance. The null hypothesis was accepted.

This result shows clearly the possibility in the distortion that are likely to be noted in secondary data generated on issues of this nature, as there is no relationship between government stated investment on infrastructural development and observed infrastructure on ground. It also further strengthens the assertion of Ali and Pernia. (2003) and Soludo (2012) that developing countries are characterized by weak governance and institutions, the tendency for government officials to be corrupt is very high, and their acclaimed collated data on investment in infrastructure may be distorted, thereby lowering the contribution of infrastructure to growth and diverting benefits intended for the poor.

Hypothesis 2 is analyzed by determining both the coefficient of correlation and the coefficient determination of the two variables in the hypothesis

H2: There is a relationship between observed infrastructure on ground and the realization of vision NV20:2020

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.979 ^a	.958	.937	50.647

a. Predictors: (Constant), stateofins

The value of 0.979 in the model summary representing the correlation coefficient between state of infrastructure on ground and the realization of Nigeria infrastructure Vision 20:2020 revealed that there is a correlation between state of infrastructure on ground and the realization of Nigeria Vision 20:2020.

A two tail test was used because the hypothesis was not directional, at 0.01 level of significance, the null hypothesis was accepted.

$(0.979)^2 = 0.958$ signifies that the contribution of state of infrastructure on infrastructure and the realization of Nigeria infrastructure Vision 20:2020 is 95.8% the remaining 4.2% is explained by some other variables

Discussion on findings

In the course of this research, it was revealed that there is a correlation between state of infrastructure on ground and the realization of Nigeria Vision 20:2020. Thus if the state of infrastructure improves the probability of achieving the set objectives of NV20:2020 increases and vice versa. Also, the strength of the contribution of state of infrastructure on infrastructure and the realization of Nigeria infrastructure Vision 20:2020 is very high. But taken a from the recent observation of Gabriel (2012) as stated below;

A country of 167 million people living without even five hours of uninterrupted power supply; where 120 million live below N200 a day; where the national and sub-national governments budget 80 per cent of resources on conspicuous consumption, where leaders are not ready to make any sacrifice for the sake of the nation, where most thing under the sun is imported, where the stench of corruption in public places is to high heavens, where you cannot sleep with your two eyes closed; will become one of the 20 largest economies in 20:2020?

With the above observation from Gabriel and about 4 years in to the NV20:2020, and about 6 years more with no *feasibly sight of rapid improvement* in the physical infrastructure and social services, even top government echelons like Sanusi, (2010), Aborisade, (2012) were of the opinion that the reality of NV20:2020 is heading toward a mirage.

According to Locke et al, (1986), Consistent and significant improvements in performance is the result of goal setting and goal setting is positively elated to performance. Setting goals improve performance and the more difficult it is to reach the goals the better the performance up to the point where goals are perceived as impossible (Stedry and Kay, 1966). But in Nigeria, each administration have shown that the more difficult it is to reach a goal the worst the situation for instance Obasanjo set out to add by 2007/2008 10,000 MW to the national grid, which subsequent administration would build on to achieve 20,000MW by 2015, Jonathan set to attain 6000MW by 2009 etc, but in both situation the state of power supply tend to remain stagnant or get worst. Hence in the above system there is no correlation between goal setting and performance of the system due to high level of corruption.

5.0 Conclusions

From the critical examination of study carried out on the blue print of NV20:2020, most researchers agreed that, it is a master plan that has the capability to change the economic situation of the nation positively if well executed. This is because, it is all encompassing, as it involves people from all strata of the nation with the private sector regarded as the engine room to propel the nations' economy. But with the current level of corruption, the possibility of the government officials to implement and enforce strategic policy stated in the plan may endanger the entire developmental plan. This can be observed even 2 years into the plan and as shown by the result in the hypotheses analysed above, where the stated amount expended on infrastructure by government do not reflect on the improve standard of living of the population. Finally, according to Osisioma, (2001) effective management of resources essentially require the 6Ms - men, machines, money, materials, methods and minutes, meaning time. But Osisioma add the 7th 'M', Morals, the requirement to demonstrate honesty and transparency as required in Section 15(5) of the 1999 Constitution, which prescribes that the State shall fight all forms of corrupt practices and abuse of office. Without doubt, any leadership or government, which is incapacitated to fight corruption that have made the state of infrastructure in the country to be in deplorable condition, is simply a failure, particularly in the context and midst of overwhelming poverty, and is not fit to continue to rule. Aborisade, (2012) stated that, neither can we implement NV20:2020 effectively. And like Peter Drucker said "Effective leadership is not about making speeches or being liked; leadership is defined by results not attributes (Gabriel, 2012).

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Appendix 1

State of
Infrastructure.

	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
SA	119	198	127	143	129	716
A	50	10	43	41	61	205
D	40	10	30	26	30	136
SD	11	2	20	10	0	43
TOTAL	220	220	220	220	220	1100

investment
on
Infrastructure

	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
SA	10	22	30	143	16	221
A	30	45	41	41	14	171
D	70	53	59	26	129	337
SD	110	100	90	10	61	371
TOTAL	220	220	220	220	220	1100

realization
of vision
20:20:20

	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
SA	91	123	65	143	129	551
A	76	47	56	41	61	281
D	42	40	54	26	30	192
SD	11	10	45	10	0	76
TOTAL	220	220	220	220	220	1100

2

Looter: Regime/persons affected		Source/Authority
Amount realized from oil sale during the Gulf War under Gen. IBB		(see Okigbo's Report, 1994)
Estimated amount stolen during the regime of Ibrahim Babangida		(see Daily Independent, November 9, 2007).
Gen. Sani Abacha's looted funds, which Obasanjo froze in 2002.		(see Sikka, 2003)
Amount looted by Mohammed Abacha		
Transmission substation contract secured by Abdulsalam Abubakar Energo		(see Vanguard Online, March 13, 2008). Without any evidence of performance as stipulated by the due process, Abubakar further used his influence to collect N13billion (US\$86,000,000) out of the contract price, but has so far achieved less than five per cent implementation (see Report of House of Representatives Committee on Power and Steal, 2008).
Nigeria Limited. after leaving office		
collected by Abubakar, out of the contract sum even before performing 5% of the contract. (see Report of House of Representatives		(see Vanguard Online, March 13, 2008). Nigerians should thank God that Abdulsalam Abubakar did not rule more than nine months – Dr. Christopher Kolade Probe Panel's report set up to probe his administration' (see Daily Sun, June 10, 2008).
Committee on Power and Steal, 2008).		
Obasanjo, (1999-2007)		
(see Senate Committee on Power and Energy Report, 2008).		In collaboration with many local cronies and some multinational companies, more than fifty per cent of the money was siphoned into personal accounts abroad (see Senate Committee on Power and Energy Report, 2008). Some of the local and foreign companies that got the contracts to provide electricity did not start the project while they have been paid more than fifty per cent of the agreed contract cost. Some were even overpaid for work not done at all. (See Director of National Independent Power Project, 2008).
Amount allegedly withdrawn by Obasanjo from the Federation Account without recourse to the National Assembly		(see Senate Committee on Finance, National Planning and Appropriation Report, 2006).
The amount former President Obasanjo could not account for while the NNPC that was under his personal control for eight years – 1999-2007.		(see Tribune, August 13, 2007).
top officials of the NNPC under the ministerial control of former President Obasanjo		(see Daily Sun, August 13, 2007).
Ministry of Works, under the former Minister of Works, Chief Tony Anenih		(see Daily Independent, May 14, 2008).
Ministry of Works, under the former Minister of Works, Chief Tony Anenih		(see Daily Independent Online, May 12, 2004).
Contracts awarded by the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) between 2001 and 2003, which were allegedly marred by large scale frauds, widespread financial recklessness, and massive inflation of contract prices.		(see This Day, February 22, 2006)
Under President Obasanjo regime		(see Punch, June 15, 2008).

Aborisade (2012)

www.academia.edu/1138251/DEVELOPMENT_PLANS_AND_VISIONS_CORRECTED_VERSION