

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN JAPAN: SOME LESSONS FOR NIGERIA

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### Introduction

Japanese bureaucracy is reputed to have developed certain distinctive characteristics that distinguish it from other bureaucracies of the world. It not only commands high respect because of its contribution to the modernization of the country, it also has a long tradition of integrity and efficiency despite its strong cultural and political connection. Its prestige and importance, according to Maheshwari (1987:3), "emerge from its functions as well as from the style and strategy of carrying them out." According to him, the bureaucracy is the originator of most laws enacted by the Diet; it administers the laws; it coordinates the activities of all sectors of the society (private industry inclusive) through implementation of prescribed rules and regulations; it disburses grants and subsidies, which makes beneficiaries to fear rather than respect it; and finally it shapes the future of the country through its intensive research and findings. It is no exaggeration, whatever may be its imperfections, that the Japanese bureaucracy successfully led the country to its primal economic position in the world today. On what is the success of this bureaucracy based? What are its most outstanding characteristics?

What this paper intends to do is to discuss the salient features of the Japanese bureaucracy and examine how these can be of use to the Nigerian Civil Service. The paper is thus divided into three sections. The first section deals with the origin, development and salient features of the Japanese bureaucracy. In the second section, some problems associated with the development of bureaucracy in Nigeria are discussed. The last part examines those lessons that can be learnt from the Japanese civil service.

### Japanese Bureaucracy: Origins and Salient Features

The origins of the public bureaucracy in Japan could be traced to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, even though traces of bureaucratic set up had emerged during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). For a perfect comprehension of this development, this section will be divided into two parts. In the first one, efforts will be made to review the developments before the Second World War. The second part will concentrate on the post-war reforms and the features that emerged from them.

### Prewar Japanese Bureaucracy

During the Tokugawa Shogunate, a civil bureaucracy with patrimonial characteristics was developed. The basic requirement for recruitment was one's social status (Silberman, 1993:161). Those that were recruited were from "the shogun's immediate vassalage in Edo" and must possess "a specified feudal family rank in the fiefs." (Koh, 1989:11) Under this bureaucratic setup, Inoki remarks, promotions and dismissals were made at the discretion of the superiors. There was no clear cut division of powers and responsibilities of offices as would be a modern bureaucracy. This led to "inefficiency, imbalance, and personal interpretation of official duties." (Inoki, 1964:286).

This was going to continue until the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Commodore Perry arrived in Japan. The arrival of the American ships not only forced the Tokugawa Shogunate to expand the scope of its recruitment to those with apparent merit, it also accelerated the developments that led to the fall of the Shogunate and the restoration of the governing power to the Emperor in 1868. During this period, Japan was exposed to the outside world and as such sought motivations from them. A number of considerations were made as to what model of bureaucracy the country should adopt, and the German model was chosen because of "its strong monarchy and authoritarian traditions." (Maheshwari, 1987:6).

Though the Meiji era signaled the introduction of modern bureaucratic system in Japan, this did not happen almost immediately. By the year 1900, a bureaucracy, organized along the legal-rational type of Weber had been set up. Recruitment was based on merit, determined by a written competitive



examination. The ordinance set up two levels of civil service examinations: higher examinations for sonin officials and ordinary ones for hannin officials. However, graduates of the Tokyo Imperial University (Todai) would be exempted from these examinations until 1893 (Koh, 1989:13).

The bureaucracy at this time was highly stratified. There were two basic divisions: the government official (Kanri) and the nonofficials (hikanri). Those in the first category were appointed by the Emperor under contract based on public law. Those in the other category were outside the jurisdiction of the Emperor and were subject to contract under private law. On the whole, there were four categories of civil servants. The first category, shinninkan, was made up of officials whose letters of appointment were personally signed by the emperor and countersigned by the prime minister. Under them came chokuninkan. It consisted of officials recruited through a competitive examination and whose letters of appointment bear the signatures of both the Emperor and the prime minister. The difference between the first two categories was that while those in the first category had their letters signed in a palace ceremony attended by the Emperor, those in the second category had no such ceremony (Koh, 1989:16). The third category, soninkan, included officials appointed by the prime minister with the approval of the Emperor. The last category, hanninkan, comprised officials appointed by the individual ministers, acting on delegated authority, and the basis of their recruitment was largely their educational qualification and sometimes by examination.

Despite the great achievement of the post Meiji era, the civil service remained undemocratic. This is because the loyalty of the civil servants was to the Emperor. The effect of this was that the bureaucrat was "officially viewed as a chosen servant of the Emperor, a politically and social superior being who derived status and privileges from his Imperial connection". (Ward, 1963:99) This attitude, some have argued, still permeates Japanese bureaucracy up till today despite the efforts made during the post war era to democratize it.

### Postwar era

The end of the World War II brought significant changes to Japan's social, economic and political life, the civil service system inclusive. As part of the efforts of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to dismantle and, where necessary, democratize the three institutions that were mainly responsible for Japanese military adventurism, far reaching reforms were carried out in the civil service.

The postwar reform of Japanese bureaucracy is largely based on the recommendations of the Hoover Mission. With the inauguration of the new Constitution in May 1947, and the passing into law of the National Public service Law (NPSL) that same year, the scene was set for a new civil service structure. This law became the governing statute of the Japanese public bureaucracy. The objective of this law is

*To assure the people democratic and efficient administration of their public affairs by establishing basic standards (including adequate measures to promote the welfare and interest of public employees) which shall be applicable to all national public employees and by providing that personnel shall be so selected and directed by democratic practices as to promote maximum efficiency in the performance of public duties. (National Personnel Authority, 1984:53; Hirose, 1995:38).*

For the achievement of the objectives stated above, the law made provision for the following (National personnel Authority, 1984:53)

1. Establishment of the National Personnel Authority with the purpose of assuring the neutrality of national public personnel administration and at the same time protecting employee's welfare and interests;
2. Appointment and promotion based on the merit principle;
3. Guarantee of employee status;



4. Compensation and other working conditions in accord with the general conditions of society;
5. Training of employees;
6. Various duties of employees.

In accordance with the National Public Service Law, the National personnel Authority (*Jinji-in*) was established in 1948. This agency, modeled after the Civil service Commission of the United States before 1976, is supposed to be non partisan and highly technical in its approach to personnel issues. It is made up of three commissioners who are versed in administrative and personnel management and not in any way connected to any political party. To guarantee the integrity of the commissioners of the NPA, their appointment, though proposed by the cabinet, is subject to approval by both houses of the Diet and confirmed by the Emperor. Article 5 of the law states that

*Commissioners of the Authority shall be appointed, with the consent of both Houses of the Diet, by the Cabinet from among persons 35 years old or more, who are of highest moral character and integrity, in known sympathy with the democratic form of government and efficient administration therein based on merit principles, and possessing a wide range of knowledge and sound judgement concerning personnel administration. The appointment and dismissal of a Commissioner shall be attested by the Emperor.*

According to the National Public Service Law, the NPA

*Shall administer matters concerning recommendations for improvement in personnel administration as well as in compensation and other conditions of work; position classification; examination, appointment and dismissal; compensation; training; status; disciplinary punishment; grievance procedure; and other matters concerning the maintenance of fairness in personnel administration, the protection of employee interests and other activities. (Art. 3, The National Public service Law. 1947)*

Based on this provision, the functions of the NPA revolve around the day to day operation of the public bureaucracy in Japan.

More than forty years after its creation, the NPA has been able to live up to the expectation of bureaucrats, seeking for ways to ameliorate personnel administration in Japan. In the subsequent pages, will try to discuss the salient features of Japanese bureaucracy based on topics like recruitment, promotion, training, compensation and retirement practice.

## Recruitment

Public employees in Japan are classified into two, that is, the national public employees, working in the national government organizations and the local public employees in local governments. The national public employees are further divided into two categories, the regular service (*ippan-shoku*) and special service (*tokubetsu-shoku*). The special service incorporates the Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Commissioners of the NPA, Judges and other court personnel, Diet personnel and most of the Self-Defence personnel. All the other national employees belong to the regular service. As of March 31, 1993, there was a total of 1,670,000 national public employees (*komuin*) in Japan, of whom 838,000 appertain to the regular service and 329,000 to the special service. The rest belong to the local government units. Compared to other advanced countries, Japan maintains a relatively small number of employees. While the number of public employees per 1,000 inhabitants in Japan is 40, it is 80 in the United Kingdom, 81 in the United States and 120 in France. (Yamamoto, 1995:5).

The *ippan-shoku* public employees, under the regular service are divided into seventeen categories for the purpose of facilitating remuneration. They are;

(1) The Administrative Service I; (2) The administrative Service II; (3) The Specialized Administrative service III (*senmon gyosei shoku*); (4) The Taxation service; (5) The Public security service I; (6) The



Public security service II; (7) The Marine service I; (8) The Marine service II; (9) The Educational Service I; (10) The Educational service II; (11) The Educational service III; (12) The Educational Service IV (13) The Research Service; (14) The Medical Service I; (15) The Medical Service II; (16) The Medical service III; (17) The designated service (shitei shoku).

The process of recruitment in Japan is very crucial since there exists a tradition of lifetime employment. So every ministry is very strict as to those that join their organization. The process at times starts from when bureaucrats are young.

*Membership is attained through what is perhaps the most rigorous process of selection anywhere in the world. The process consists of a series of ruthlessly competitive examinations, which may begin, indirectly, as early as kindergarten ... from the simple counting tests and parent interviews, which are part of the admission process to a prestigious kindergarten, to the nerve-wracking examinations for university entrance, academic performance is the criterion for advancement at every step. After graduating from a university, a would-be bureaucrat must once again score highly – this time on the ministry's own qualifying examination. Those who succeed are surely the cream of the crop, and it is no wonder that the ministries take such pains in preparing their newly appointed employees for their future leadership role. (Japan Culture Institute, 1979:79-80).*

The principle guiding recruitment can be found in Article 33, paragraph 1 of the NPSL which states that: *Appointment of an employee shall ... be made entirely on the basis of the result of his examination and the merit of his performance of duties or other demonstrated abilities.*

The relevant examinations are organized by the NPA and open to everybody with equal opportunity. The essence of the examination is to judge the abilities of persons seeking to perform public duties. There are three distinct levels of examinations based on the level of education attained. The highest level, Type I (isshu) since 1985, is meant for graduates of four year colleges; the intermediate level, type II (nishu), is for graduates of junior colleges and the lower level, Type III (sanshu), is for high school graduates. In the higher (type I) examination, candidates are required to specialize on one of about 28 subjects provided, from public administration to law, engineering and to the wider sciences. They are subjected to rigorous tests both multiple choice and essay type on general knowledge and their choice of specialization. The names and scores of successful candidates are compiled in the order of merit by the NPA on the eligibility list which are sent to the ministries.

The ministries have the final say over recruitment. Each ministry accepts the list, conducts interviews for the candidates and selects the ones it feels are best for the organization. Recent attempts by the government to change the recruitment pattern, so that, all career bureaucrats would be hired by one body, compared with the current practice of each ministry hiring separately, is being blocked by bureaucrats. (*The Daily Yomiuri*, May 31, 1996:3)

Despite the difficulties in passing these examinations, as demonstrated by the low number of successful candidates, the number of intending candidates keeps on increasing. In the fiscal year 1994, 17 types of examinations were held, the number of candidates that applied was 323,143 out of which only 21,000 passed. It should be remarked that less than 10% of applicants usually pass. Moreover, passing the examination is not a guarantee for employment in the public service. In 1993 for example, only 647 candidates out of the 1,863 that passed the Level I examination were actually recruited (Yamamoto, 1995:6). This means that the civil service in the country, contrary to any other expressed opinion, still fascinates young graduates.

## Promotion

The promotion aspect of Japanese bureaucracy is vital to our research in two ways. Firstly, it will throw light on the recruitment method to see if there is any extraneous influence on the procedure. Secondly, discussing the promotion process will enlighten us as to how this has affected, affects or will affect employee behavior. It is no gain saying the ways and manner promotions of employees are



decided will determine employee behavior and commitment. This is even more important given the established tradition, as earlier mentioned, of life employment.

There are two basic ways of gaining promotion in Japanese bureaucracy. The first one is through competitive examinations organized for those employees holding lower position levels than the one under consideration. The second procedure is via an evaluation process, based on the service records of prospective candidates. As regards this, Article 37 of the NPSL stipulates:

*Promotion of personnel shall be by competitive examination ... among incumbents of government positions of lower levels than that of the government position under consideration. However, the Authority may at its discretion restrict the scope of persons to be examined when it is deemed necessary. In cases where, in view of the duties and responsibilities of the position to which promotion is to be made, the Authority deems it impracticable to hold an examination among the incumbents concerned, promotion may be made by means of an evaluation based on the past service record of such incumbents.*

Of the two methods, the second one seems to be more prevalent in most ministries. Vacancies are normally filled by candidates from within the ministry based on the number of years they have spent on their current grade and their personal competence. In most cases, the competence aspect may not be a principal determinant since it is assumed that the candidate will acquire the necessary skill when he reaches the new post.

In general, promotion is based on seniority. Nevertheless, each ministry and agency has its own promotion criteria. The year of entry (nenji) of civil servants is very crucial as their promotion is based on this. The members of the same year are promoted together to the next grade until they get to the position of assistant Section Chief (kacho hosa). After this, a number of other yardsticks are introduced like familiarity with those advising on promotions, especially the director of the personnel division of the ministry, the opinion of the immediate superior and personal relationships cultivated by a civil servant with superior officers, one's estimation by peer groups and subordinate staff, the clout one has with influential persons in the hierarchy as well as in the ruling party, and the political acceptability of the civil servant, when it concerns Administrative vice-Ministers.

The seniority system is not without its advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages is the fact that it suppresses, at least to some extent, external influence in the promotion of bureaucrats. Moreover, it has served as a way of safeguarding, to a large degree, the bureaucracy from political intervention. Bureaucrats are assured of impartiality at the beginning of their career, which is somehow encouraging to face the future challenges in the profession. Nonetheless, the system is at the same time seen as favoring laziness. The personal efforts of individual bureaucrats, which could be of help eventually in their careers, are not taken into consideration initially. This may kill motivations. As one career officer put it:

*We climb the hierarchy with exactly the same speed. The question is which post one is assigned to ... as we climb with the same speed, there is no real competition, although almost all of us, having gone through a very competitive educational system, are competitive in a good sense. That is, everybody is a genuinely hard worker, disliking easy posts. Usually we are intelligent, but, surprisingly, some of us are not so intelligent. Because we are given reasonably responsible and important jobs while in a junior grade, the stupid ones become conspicuous at once. They are not, however, punished, at least in salary or grade. This kind of promotion continues until we become counselors. From then on it is luck. (Craig, 1975:7-8).*

The luck mentioned by this official could eventually catapult one to the highest administrative position of Administrative vice-Minister (jimi jikan). Once a member of the class group gets to this position, the tradition in Japan is for other colleagues to retire en mass. This practice is viewed as, firstly, a way of not disturbing the cultural tradition of hierarchical relationship that prevents one from



issuing order to one's classmate; and secondly as a means of administrative elite renewal. The mass retirements create spaces for new entrants into the civil service.

### Training

The training programmes of bureaucrats can be divided into two: on the job and off the job training. These programmes vary from one ministry to the other. Example of the Ministry of finance will suffice.

A new entrant into the Ministry of Finance is assigned to the planning staff of one of its key division to gain a general orientation. In the second year, he is transferred to a district branch to familiarize him with operations there. In the third and fourth year, he is normally sent to a prestigious university abroad for his masters, or at times doctorate degree. On his return, he resumes at the head office to manage for one year one of the smaller administrative sections. In the sixth year, he takes responsibility for the management of a branch office. After having served in various areas and thoroughly used to "the responsibilities and prerogatives of power", he is brought to the ministry hierarchy in Tokyo. One common feature of the programme we discussed is rotation. A new entrant is exposed to virtually all the sections in the ministry to inculcate in him the tradition of his new found family, and intimate him with the operations of the ministry, thereby preparing him for supervisory duties.

### Compensation

The compensation pattern is also important to this study. It has been mentioned that the bureaucracy attracts the best in the society. Could this be as a result of the remuneration?

The NPA is legally given the responsibility to determine the pay of public employees based on the duties and responsibilities of their positions and the general conditions of the society. Civil servants are forbidden to bargain directly for their wages and to engage in strikes. The civil service pay is composed of salary and allowances on the ratio of 86:14. The basic monthly salary is stated in the salary schedule. There are also various allowances like family allowance, city allowance, commuter allowance, housing allowance and overtime allowance. All these are paid monthly. Other allowances are half year allowance and assiduity allowance which are paid three times a year –March, June and December.

The salaries and allowances are reviewed annually based on NPA's recommendation. This revision is done through the following steps.

1. Survey of the salary level in the private sector
2. Survey of the salaries of all national public service
3. Comparison of survey results
4. Survey of prices and living expenses, based on opinions and demands from the administrations and employee organizations
5. Revision plan of the salary schedules and allowances
6. Recommendation to Diet and Cabinet
7. Revision of pay law by Diet

In accordance with the above procedure, the National Personnel Authority recently recommended that the monthly salaries of national government employees be raised by an average of 3,336 yen or 0.95 percent to 352,978 in fiscal year 1996 starting from April 1. This is much higher than the 0.9 percent rise in the previous year, and it is warranted by the pay hikes that private sector workers had this year following the economic recovery.

On the average, salaries in the private sector are 3,975 yen (1.18%) higher per month. While the starting salary for university graduates in the public service is 179,200 yen, it is 180,000 in the private sector. This system of compensation, so far, has not displeased the bureaucrats.



## Retirement and Reemployment

One other aspect of Japanese bureaucracy that has engendered commentaries from researchers is the retirement and reemployment culture. Prior to March 1985, there was no systemic age requirement for retirement except for public prosecutors and staff of national universities. Retirement was done through recommendation by various organizations concerned. Since 1985, the retirement age for the regular national employees has been fixed for 60 years. Even then, majority of bureaucrats in Japan retire well before the stipulated age. Three things await them after their retirement: one, their separation pay, two, their pension and three the possibility of starting a second career in the private sector or in public corporations or as a politician in the Diet, after winning an election. This post retirement career is called Amakudari (descent from heaven). It is this that makes retirement important. Increasing number of bureaucrats have chosen second careers after retirement in spite of the legal restriction to the practice. Most ministries chart avenues for their retiring officers by exploring previous contacts with their clients. Top of the list are the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry because of their high connection with the private sector. However, with many private financial institutions headed by ex-bureaucrats finding themselves in financial mess, the Ministry of Finance recently declared it would place voluntary restrictions on retired bureaucrats who are offered senior positions at private financial institutions. This maybe difficult to do.

The other post retirement career bureaucrats dabble into is politics. This may not be as easy as the first one since they have to face the electorate. But the commonest way is to join the ruling party and contest for elective post either at the national or prefectural level. Many political leaders after the war were former bureaucrats. For instance, 43% of cabinet members from 1948 to 1977 were ex-bureaucrats (Yamamoto, op. Cit. 11). In the elections of July 6, 1986, for example, 80 former higher bureaucrats were elected into the House of Representatives and 24 of the 72 LDP candidates elected into the House of Councillors were ex-bureaucrats (Koh, 1989:242).

This practice has been compensating for whatever shortcoming maybe attributed to the principle of early retirement. It gives bureaucrats the chance of utilizing their resources for the development of the private sector. There is no doubt that the industries that employ them need their services, even if it maybe to the detriment of the staff within such organizations that take them. As for politician bureaucrats, it may be a way of imputing their bureaucratic experience into policy formulation.

With Amakudari, one of my Japanese colleagues remarked, the civil service maybe the surest way of climbing the social ladder in Japan. This I believe maybe more probable if one joins one of the most powerful ministries, that is, those who determine the economic policy of the country like the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

## Some Obstacles to Bureaucratic Development in Nigeria

The first obstacle to bureaucratic development in Africa in general is the absence of authentic sentiments of nationalism. As in most African countries, it is difficult to talk of the Nigerian state because most of the ingredients of statehood are absent in the polity. Nigeria, for example, after thirty eight years of independence still strives to keep its ethnic groups together. In countries with national unity problems, inter-ethnic conflict emerges as a result of struggles between rival ethnic groups for the control of the state apparatus. In this type of situation, as we have in Nigeria,

*There is the absence of any strong feelings of national consciousness on the part of public, their political representatives or public officials. All of these are more committed to lobby the political executives to ensure that their "sons" and "daughters" in the public service get promoted! More common is the general tendency for public officials to concentrate government investment to choice areas – their own villages or those of their bosses (Olowu, 1984:96).*



This is a form of group loyalty which is completely different from the Japanese experience. The government has tried through various means to mask this fact, its existence becomes obvious when Nigerians look for federal civil service jobs. The federal government, in one of its attempts at ethnic balancing in public service positions introduced the principle of federal character into the 1979 Constitutions.

The introduction of this principle into the recruitment for the federal civil service positions is nothing but a direct attack on the principles of merit and competence. It has "made it impossible to maintain uniform standards for everyone as regards recruitment, the measurement of performance and advancement within the civil service." (Asiodu, 1979:22) This has led to frustrations among some public servant and has done significant damage to the esprit de corps of the service (Gboyega, 1988).

On other trait of the Nigerian society that constitutes an obstacle to the effectiveness of its bureaucracy is what Jonathan Moyo has called the "sociology of patronage," which he defines as "the excessive cultural personalization of public issues and public business ... the process of value formation by which personal and localized ties are asserted at the expense of the national interest." (1992:98) In this type of situation, the official is inseparable from the office he occupies thereby personalizing bureaucratic operations, contrary to impersonality recommended by Weber.

The effects of the features discussed above are administrative weaknesses and dysfunctions. Bureaucrats are caught within the search for ethnic/family loyalty and the promotion of efficiency. The problems of this civil service with low morale and productivity have been correctly identified by Phillips (1991) and Fajonyomi (1996). Among the weaknesses identified by Phillips are, lack of measurable objectives, inadequate evaluations, mismanagement of time, inadequate facilities, disorganization, personnel mismanagement, neglect of training.

Other dysfunctions, according to Fajonyomi (1996), include the neglect of the formal chain of command in bureaucratic operations. Because of the form of personal relationships that exist between some superior officers and their subordinates, normal chain of command is bypassed in the name of family obligations, friendship and patronage. Consequently, applications of administrative regulations and disciplines are slackened. The end result is what we can call administrative ineptitude, where tasks are assigned but are not done, and such officers cannot be reprimanded because of their links with some highly placed personalities somewhere.

In addition, there exist serious problems in the recruitment of officers. The kind of professionalization that is required for an efficient bureaucracy is absent because officials are not mainly recruited on the basis of their job related skills. This problem is considered as one of "African predicament." As Andreski has noted,

*There are limits to the disregard for qualifications in making appointments: to be engaged as a pilot one must be able to fly, and nobody without some special knowledge will be able to construct a building which will stand ... Nevertheless, within these broad limitations and with very few exceptions, the allocation of posts in public services is mostly determined by criteria which have nothing to do with fitness for the job. (Moyo, 1992:83-84)*

Recruitment is highly influenced despite the laid down regulations. The quality of the candidates is often not taken into consideration. Group affiliation, especially ethnicity, or other forms of considerations take precedence in appointment or selection for offices or positions. Based on this form of recruitment, one should not expect much from officers who lack the required qualifications, but perform responsibilities meant for professionals.

### **Lessons from the Japanese bureaucracy**

There are many lessons that can be learnt from the Japanese bureaucracy to improve on the deficiencies of the Nigerian civil service. In this section, I will only choose those ones whose adaptability to the Nigerian situation will pose no environmental problems. These lessons, I believe, should be directed at behavioral and structural aspects of the bureaucracy. First of all, there is the need by the Nigerian civil servants to be more committed to their jobs. Punctuality is also a thing that



Japanese bureaucrats cherish a lot. This is almost absent in the Nigerian bureaucratic ethic. Nigerian bureaucrats are self centered, probably because of their nonchalant attitude to their profession contrary to the groupist ethic of the Japanese bureaucrats. Consequently, there is the need to kill the individualist/personalist attitudes of Nigeria bureaucrats through

- (i) conceptualization of a successful, efficient and rational system of ordering human effort for collective purposes and;
- (ii) a systematic process of matching the otherwise discrete and variable interests of individuals with those derived from (i) above (Moyo, 1992:112).

This proposition is not different from the in-group consciousness of the Japanese bureaucrats. The sacrifice of individualism, otherwise referred to as *meshi hoko* in Japanese, is really necessary if the Nigerian bureaucracy actually wants to live up to expectation. This may have been criticized as hurting individual psychological development. However, it has helped Japan to reach a high stage of development, piloted by the bureaucrats. This is not far from what Nigeria needs. A dose of *meshi hoko* will be most welcome. It is in this aspect, without doubt, that the Japanese bureaucracy has excelled, and this is one of the sources where its members draw their force from.

The role of the National personnel Authority will also be interesting for Nigeria. Compared to the highly criticized and mediocre Nigerian Civil Service Commission, the NPA is more professional oriented and independent in its acts than its Nigerian counterpart. The process of selection of its commissioners contributes to its integrity. The Nigerian Civil service Commissioner is an executive body and the government appoints its members. Though the appointment of its members requires the ratification of the National Assembly, according to the 1979 and 1989 constitutions, there are no stipulated required professional qualifications for its members as it is the case with the NPA. This allows the president to appoint just anybody, versed or not in administrative and personnel management, as members of the commission. This is also a very serious problem and I presume that fashioning the selection of its members after the Japanese mode will augment the integrity of the commission and its members.

Another lesson that could be drawn from the Japanese experience is in the area of recruitment and promotion. While I cannot recommend the "escalator promotion system" because of its disrespect for personal merit, the emphasis placed on qualification and experience will highly benefit the Nigerian civil service. There is no denying the fact that favoritism exist in the Japanese bureaucracy. But this is when bureaucrats get to the higher posts of bureau chief or administrative vice-minister. The promotion maybe influenced by the minister, but it is strictly based on merit, since the affected bureaucrats already have the required seniority and experience.

In my contacts with the lower level bureaucracies of the city and regional governments I discovered that mayors and governors influence recruitment and promotion, especially in some agencies created outside the city and regional governments like the museum or policy and research bureau. However, these officers, even though benefited from their connections are qualified for the jobs they are doing. Merit is not sacrificed on the altar of political patronage or personal connections.

Perhaps the best way to inculcate the Japanese experience into Nigerian bureaucrats maybe to do as the Americans, that is, institute a sort of short term training programme for them in Japan. (The Daily Yomiuri, Augusts 21, 1996, Front page) direct contact with the Japanese bureaucrats will go along way at resocializing the badly demoralized and inefficient Nigerian bureaucrats.

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