

# CHAPTER THREE

## MOHAMED BUBA MARWA: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES OF GOVERNANCE

— *Banji Fajonyomi, Ph.D. Peter Okebukola, Ph.D. & Bamgbose Adele*

The gramophone is an invention of Thomas Edison. In the 1940s and 50s, the box injected music-induced happiness into many Nigerian homes. The big snaky head of the gramophone seating on the LP record and the blare of music oozing from a trumpet-like source amazed rural and urban children and adults alike. Many poked to see where the sound came from. Such knowledge, it was believed, could provide the secret of the success of the gramophone. Like the gramophone, Colonel Mohamed Buba Marwa has been reported to put smiles on the faces of Lagosians and put joy in their hearts. In this chapter, we bring you the findings of our probe into what makes the Marwa gramophone so succouring to most rural and urban dwellers, and to the youth and adults in Lagos State. It is an attempt to uncloak the much-talked about “Marwa magic” phenomenon. The intention is to assay and characterise its active ingredients and finally name the formula.

The scientific experimental model is, perhaps, apt in further elucidation of this chapter. Two situations are presented, two farmlands — A and B, for example. Farmland A parades luxuriant green foliage with heavy yield. Weeds are scanty, but there are a few rogue species growing between the crops. The foliage in Farmland B, on the other hand, is less luxuriant and green, yield is low and weeds predominate. Farmland A is the experimental farmland with some treatment X. Farmland B is the control with no treatment. The nature of X, the treatment, is a major key to the differences observed between Farmlands A and B. This chapter sets out as a search for X in the governance of Lagos State.

The cardinal importance of this chapter demands some stress. If we know the ingredients of the Marwa success story, we could apply the same ingredients in the governance of Lagos State beyond the Marwa years if

further improvement of the profile of the State is the goal. If we know the Marwa winning formula, governance at the Local Government and Federal levels would be enhanced by the adoption of this formula in its pure form or in a modified state. The importance of the chapter can also be seen in its explanation of why Colonel Marwa did what he did and why he did not do some other things. No doubt, the chapter will bring relief sighs to Marwa lovers and haters.

The chapter is in three parts. It begins with theoretical perspectives of strategies of governance. The second part presents the findings of our investigation into the tactics and strategies of governance adopted by Colonel Marwa especially in the areas of material and human resource management. The third section draws inferences and conclusions from these findings.

### **On Rulers and Strategies of Governance**

An important characteristic in the life of every nation is the ability of its leaders to fashion out tactics and strategies that are designed for ensuring development. Development of a nation is anchored on good political leadership hence the conclusion that "nations are made not born" (Otite, 1976:4)<sup>i</sup>. The act of bringing development to a geographical entity may be exogeneously or endogeneously motivated. For instance, European colonialists that left their countries for some Third World countries following the formalisation of the Berlin conference of 1885 claimed to have brought with them development in varying degrees. Such development is exogenously motivated. Such 'a piece of Europe in Africa' (Ake, 1983:44)<sup>ii</sup> is not cherished by African leaders as they desire to chart a new course of development for Africa from within (endogeneously). Leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah insisted that new strategies of development that best suited the African environment should be devised. No wonder different countries in Africa have come up with one form of development strategy or the other.

Beginning from 1960 — the year many African countries attained independence, there arose an upsurge of strategies from African leaders that were aimed at bringing about considerable transformation in social, economic and political structures (Nwosu and Ofoegbu, 1986:272)<sup>iii</sup>. In Algeria, this strategy is referred to as self-management while in Tanzania it is called Ujamma (Jinadu, 1980:213)<sup>iv</sup>.

A field study tour by Gutteridge revealed that a number of African



countries have come under military rule. The myriad of military regimes in Africa as in other systems of the world is dominated by military guardianship, reformist and radicals (Elaigwu, 1985:183)<sup>v</sup>. It is guardian in nature when its major pre-occupation centers on the maintenance of law and order. This usually takes place when there has been a total breakdown of law and order prior to the military take-over. A military regime is radical when it acts as a linkage of interest between military officers who are generally of the lower middle classes and the masses. A military is reformist if it is concerned mainly with creating a national identity and promoting orderly economic development (Elaigwu, 1985:184).

No doubt the military especially in Africa has moved from its flotsam and jetsam position as seen by many scholars to a recognisable position. This is why we agree with Samuel P. Huntington 'that military behaviour is determined by the social and political condition of the society in which they are operating'. Agreed that the military's role has changed substantially, how then has the military played this reformist role in Africa? It has replaced parliamentary democracy and usurped parliamentary functions. The military has been seen as a uniting agent of various heterogeneous ethnic groups. For instance, it has been able to unite between 250 and 300 ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Even though we have stressed the reformist role of the military, it is significant to point out that this task can be performed by military rulers who have socialist goals. With the socialist orientation, the Ethiopian military established the Peasant Associations and the Urban dwellers Association called the Kebeles. The Kebeles performed a number of functions such as land distribution, adjudication of land disputes, establishment of service co-operatives and the distribution of market and farm products among others. The barrage of criticisms that were levied against the peasant Association prompted the military to strengthen the role of the peasant Associations. A further step led to the establishment of Revolutionary and Development Committees comprising students and peasants. By 1978, the Ethiopian military took a bolder step by creating the All Ethiopian Peasant Association.

In Burkina Faso the military government under Lamizana in 1975 formed the National Movement for Renovation. The movement was to perform a number of functions to mobilise and organise the masses for development, to work for the social, political and cultural emancipation of the people and to work for lasting economic development for the country. In the

Republic of Benin by 1975, the military organised all students who had completed their studies into a twelve-month course. The training provided was a prerequisite for employment. In Niger Republic, the military leadership brought into existence the traditional village and regional groups otherwise known as the Samarias. Samarias consisted of the youth, the women and the elders.

In Nigeria, the military government of General Yakubu Gowon proved itself a reforming regime. After the end of the civil war in 1970, Gowon came up with a 7-point programme. These included (i) reorganisation of the armed forces; (ii) the implementation of the National Development Plan and repair of the damage and neglect of the war; (iii) the eradication of corruption in our national life; (iv) the settlement of the question of the creation of more states; (v) the preparation of a new constitution; (vi) introduction of a new revenue allocation formula; and (vii) conducting a national population census. Other military and civilian rulers in Nigeria followed with their unique strategies of governance — Murtala Mohammed, Olusegun Obasanjo, Shehu Shagari, Mumammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha and Abdulsalami Abubakar. The zoom lens in this chapter will now pan out from the national spectre and focus on Lagos State and on Colonel Marwa's tactics and strategies of governance.

### **What Tactics and Strategies?**

In our quest for data on the strategies of governance applied by Colonel Marwa, we came up with fourteen major types that can be said to be distinctly "Marwan". We gleaned data from interviews from his close associates in the public and military services. We conducted in-depth, non-participant observation of his actions and utterances. We also subjected to close study, the outcomes of his actions during his tenure of office as Military Administrator of Lagos State. Our findings show that five of the tactics are typically employed in a sequence by Colonel Marwa. These are *Recce*, *Blitzkrieg*, *Scenario Analysis*, *Strategic Planning*, and *Advance-Capture-and-Hold*. The RBSSA tactics and the other nine will now be described.

**Recce:** The first thing Colonel Marwa does on being given a governance assignment, as our investigations showed, is to conduct a very quick reconnaissance (recce) of the terrain to be governed. He was an officer of the 3 Recce Regiment, little wonder his training in this area comes to the fore. As



soon as the responsibility for governance is formally announced, he "recce" the region, collecting vital information in the process. The recce exercise is done through primary and secondary sources. The primary source is through personal and unobtrusive check of the terrain. The secondary source is through his agents and from reading relevant materials. The recce process is quick and precise, oftentimes not exceeding a week. There are two major end products of the recce exercise. The first is information on human and material (including financial) resources available for the realisation of his vision and objectives for the State. The second is the identification of obstacles that could inhibit the early attainment of his mandate.

**Blitzkrieg:** This is the rapid, obstacle removing process that is usually dramatic and with stunning positive effect. In 1939, the German Luftwaffe, armoured corps and infantry used the tactic to overrun Poland in a few days. Within a short period after assuming office as Military Administrator of Borno State and after the recce exercise, Colonel Buba Marwa sacked the cabinet. The recce data showed that the Commissioners did not share his type of vision for the State and could pose a problem for the realisation of the vision. He relieved Alhaji Mahdi Bukar, the then incumbent Secretary to Borno State Government of his post. The same fate befell the Principal Secretary to the Governor. He appointed his new SSG, the then Director-General in the Information Ministry, Alhaji Mohamed Kagu Alibe, while Alhaji Musa Saleh became the Principal Secretary to the Governor. In Lagos State, a similar pattern emerged. Barely a week after assuming office, Colonel Marwa sacked all the ten commissioners he inherited from his predecessor in office. He justified his sacking of the Lagos cabinet on "the need to meet our goals and objectives" as well as discourage politicians from holding appointive offices at the state level during the transition programme. In sacking the cabinet he inherited from his predecessor in Borno State, Colonel Marwa had declared that he had stayed long enough with them to know that "they cannot run the race I want to run."

History was to repeat itself on the appointment of SSG in Lagos State. Chief Fidelis Adeyemi, the then incumbent Secretary to the State Government was replaced with Mrs. Olufunmilayo Opeyemi da-Silva, the then Director-General of the Information Ministry, as was the case in Borno in 1990. It needs to be mentioned that the appointment of the SSG from the Information Ministry in both cases is purely coincidental. In the case of Lagos State, Mrs

Olufunmilayo da-Silva was appointed purely on personal merit. The story goes that she impressed the new MILAD the most during the early briefing sessions in terms of understanding of goings-on in her Ministry, problem-solving skills, job brilliance and vision for the State.

**Scenario Analysis:** This is the collection of situational data from various heads ('commanders') of government establishments and the consideration of different perspectives (scenarios) for making such establishments more functional and efficient. A typical session went like this:

*Colonel Marwa:* Welcome. Who is the Head here? Please introduce yourself and let your colleagues introduce themselves.

=====

*Introduction of officials begins.*

*Colonel Marwa with expressionless face punctuated with occasional and brisk smile scans the group*

=====

*Colonel Marwa:* Now, give me a full briefing of your place — what you do, what your problems are and how you have been tackling them, your plans for the future and how you intend achieving them?

*Head (Director-General):* Your Excellency, on behalf of my colleagues and I, I welcome you to Lagos State and we wish you a very successful tenure of office. This write-up contains information on the Ministry (handing out the document which Colonel Marwa receives with respect, places it on the table in front of him without opening it). I now wish to present as follows:

*... the Director-General of the Ministry reels on. Colonel Marwa keeps the document shut and just takes notes.*



*Colonel Marwa:* Please wait a moment. On the subject of X, can you tell me more about why the situation is the way it is and how you plan to tackle it?

There is a critical review of the situation by the MILAD, Secretary to the State Government and other Directors-General present. Different scenarios are described. The merits and demerits of each scenario are highlighted. Notes are taken especially by the MILAD and SSG for further action.

**Strategic Planning:** After possible scenarios are described, Colonel Marwa settles down to the strategic planning process. In military parlance, this is akin to the concept of appreciation. Marwa's Military Dictionary for the Nigerian Army defines appreciation as "*A logical and methodical process of reasoning designed to help in arriving at the best possible solution to a problem in a given situation*". The questions that are answered in the strategic planning process are: What is my objective? What resources have I got to achieve the objective? What are the possible pathways towards achieving the objective? There is a Plan A showing the pathway to be followed, resources to be utilised and techniques to be adopted. If for any reason Plan A fails at a point, there is a backup Plan B. There could be other backup plans — C, D, etc. Of all the tactics that Colonel Marwa adopts in governance, this is one of the most important. The strategic plans are held close to his chest and they constantly guide his actions.

One of the products of the strategic planning process is the derivation of priorities. There are several competing demands and societal needs. The resources are, however, limited. Rather than scratch the surfaces of all the needs, priorities are identified and each priority area is exhaustively addressed. The priority areas identified include security, roads, health, and education.

**Advance-Capture-and-Hold:** This is the action phase of achieving the targets in each priority area. It is the phase that earns him the "Marwa Magic" label. Leading his team of committed and dedicated staff, he 'advances' rapidly towards his objective and before you know it, the objective is successfully attained (captured). To show that it is not cosmetic victory, he ensures that there is no relapse. The victory endures. He holds the objective firmly. A few

examples could be illustrative of this tactic. Security was top priority. Within a few weeks of assuming office, motorised patrols of Operation Sweep squads were virtually everywhere and the hoodlums dived for cover. A year later, *Operation Sweep* had been strengthened. Two years later, *Operation Sweep* operators had gained greater sophistication. The scheme moved into high-tech gear, details of which are presented in Chapter 10. The MILAD injected more men and equipment into the scheme and took direct control of operations. He created the Air Wing to improve the efficiency of the whole outfit. To complement these efforts, he commissioned the Neighbourhood Watch. In spite of the shortcomings and the complaints against some members of *Operation Sweep*, the scheme has impacted positively on the security of lives and property in the State. It is this success that explains the proliferation of similar outfit in other states of the federation like Ogun, Oyo, Rivers, and Imo.

Roads constituted another priority. Many people had thought the question of bad roads in Lagos could not be solved because of the high cost involved in procuring bitumen. Few weeks into being in office, the pot-holed roads took a nicer look. The rains came and attempted to do some damage. This was not allowed to happen by staff of the Direct Labour Agency. The roads were further strengthened and many more urban and rural roads were tarred. Two years later, from Operation 100, we had Operation 250. In his last days in office, the roads continued to be improved upon. To ease the bitumen problem, the Administrator acquired a new asphalt plant that is capable of producing more than 250 tonnes of asphalt per hour and about 7,200 tonnes per day. This has helped not only in saving cost of road maintenance but also in providing a continued solution to the perennial problem of bad roads in Lagos.

**Multidimensional checking:** Top government officials surveyed reported that Colonel Marwa conducts multiple-perspective checking of the progress of an assignment he gives. While he awaits progress report from the officer to whom a task is given, unknown to that officer, one or more other progress-checking schemes are put in place. This strategy is not instituted because of lack of trust. It is to get assurance that, at the end of the day, the job is done successfully and on target.

Cases have been reported during briefing sessions when some officers narrated success stories of assignments given them. Such officers were asked to reconcile their reports with those received from the MILAD's parallel



sources. The parallel sources, in most cases, had objective and more accurate 'sitrep' (situation report). The briefing sessions where such conflicts occurred had served as lessons for the officers 'not to take Colonel Marwa for granted'.

***Chest/Treasury Up-to-dateness:*** Ability to tell how much is in the chest of government or the treasury, with near 100% accuracy without a phone call to the Finance Ministry is not the strength of many rulers. This happens to be one of the unique strengths of Colonel Marwa. It is an important characteristic for his success in Lagos State. He keeps a moment-by-moment record of intake into government coffers and record of expenditure in a little book he carries with him. This is reconciled periodically with the Ministry of Finance and with the banks. In spite of access to computer technology for such record keeping, Colonel Marwa retains his faith in manually carrying out the operation. Any time of day or night, in the office or at home, Colonel Marwa can tell how much the State has received from different sources, how much the state has spent on different projects and what balance is left. "You can't fool Marwa", top Finance Ministry officials often say. One of Colonel Marwa's close aides expressed his marvel at the MILAD's computational skills. Multiplication or division of complex figures? Before the technocrat drags out a calculator, Colonel Marwa does a double quick mental calculation and announces the answer — error free!

***Cut-your-coat-according-to-your-cloth Strategy:*** It is common practice for Chief Executives to make commitments without cognisance of funds available to see such commitments through. Not for Colonel Marwa. Since he knows the quantum of funds available by the minute, he does not commit beyond that. He avoids making political promises. He makes only promises that he can fulfil. If State funds cannot support a project, he does not make a commitment to undertake it. If funds can only support N10 million worth of the project, he makes only a N10-million commitment. The MILAD cuts his coat strictly according to his cloth. The money committed is released, the job is done, and everybody is happy. This is one of the secrets behind the smiles on the faces of the Lagos people.

***Accountability:*** This is the core concept in whatever strategy Colonel Marwa adopts in governance. **He preaches and practises accountability on a daily basis.** Officers that have failed in his accountability assessment have been

dealt with decisively. In order to let people see what accountability means in practice, he demonstrates by example. "Leadership by example" is another of his buzz phrases.

***Empathy for the Masses:*** Market fire in central Lagos, collapsed public building on the mainland, petrol problem all over Lagos, community clashes, poisonous "akara" at Ketu, explosion at the Trade Fair Complex and other incidents involving the masses, as it happens, Colonel Marwa is there shortly after. Like the CNN advert, as it happens anywhere in Lagos State, the MILAD is there to share the pains with the masses and soothe their sore souls. In the heat of the fuel problem when the temper of Lagosians had reached flash point, Colonel Marwa went, not in the safety of his tank but openly to see the situation for himself and talk to the masses. Such rare bravery and love for the people have endeared the MILAD to the heart of the people of Lagos State.

On housing, the administration made efforts not only to complete abandoned/uncompleted housing programmes, but also to initiate new ones. The Otedola Jubilee Housing Scheme started by Sir Michael Otedola in 1992 was completed and commissioned, while a new Ikeja Housing project, comprising 80 four bedroom duplexes, 80 four bedroom terrace units, 72 four bedroom flats and 72 three bedroom flats was started. There is also the Owutu Housing Scheme. To check the ever increasing rents in Lagos, Marwa enacted the "Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Premises Edict" of 1997. The object of the Edict was to bring sanity to the issue of high rent in the state by fixing "a standard rent and terms of tenancy agreement applicable in respect of the type of houses commonly available to low and middle level income earners". The Edict also set up various tribunals to try erring landlords.

Marwa's efforts in the area of health are also masses-oriented. Apart from renovating most of the dilapidated hospital buildings, about N300 million was spent on equipment, while the drug revolving scheme was revived with about N50 million. Perhaps the most commendable action of the Administrator was his decision to make the treatment of malaria free in all Lagos hospitals. Mothers and children on admission in Lagos State public hospitals are also to be fed free. Other masses-oriented programmes of his regime are "Operation Light up Lagos" that restored street lights to Lagos, and the restoration of the State broadcasting outfit — Lagos State Broadcasting Corporation.



**Reward for Committed Staff:** All the Honourable Commissioners, Permanent Secretaries and Chief Executives of parastatals surveyed were in accord that one of Colonel Marwa's strategies is to make you happy if you are committed to work, through a good reward system. The caveat here is that you are rewarded as long as you are honest, committed and productive. Some claimed that they had never been as rewarded by a State's Chief Executive as Colonel Marwa had done. All the Directors in the State have not ceased to talk about their official cars. One of the Permanent Secretaries interviewed said, "Look, in the one-and-half years I have worked with Colonel Marwa, I have enjoyed tremendous job satisfaction, much more than in several years spent with previous State leaders. The man is simply generous. But mind you, the man does not take any nonsense. If you fall out of line, even if he likes you, he will deal with you firmly".

Marwa may have applied these skills to make Lagos State Civil servants live up to their responsibilities. He is aware, for example that, for people to give their best, they must be adequately motivated through regular salaries, welfare scheme and other little things, which bad managers ignore. Commenting on the use of sanctions and reward, the Colonel remarked:

... Within an organisation, if they know that if they fail to do what they are paid to do, there will be a sanction, they will tend to be circumspect as far as misbehaviour is concerned. They will try to do what they are told to do ... if they do what is right they will be rewarded for it ... Once people themselves recognise that there is a big stick hanging and a carrot hanging, they might as well go for the carrot (*Newswatch*, January 12, 1998 : 25)

The carrot that Marwa dangles include the setting aside monthly of about N300 million for welfare scheme of civil servants, teachers and the judiciary for cars, housing loan, refurbishment, repairs/renovations, etc. During fuel scarcity palliative measures are put in place for Lagos State civil servants to compensate them for hardship experienced during the period.

**Reflective Diplomacy:** This is a combination of reflectivity (as compared with impulsivity) and diplomacy. Many leaders, the literature has shown, are impulsive. They act too quickly and on the spur of the moment. They react to

information without deep thought and reflections on the consequences of their actions. The impulsive leader does a lot of talk and follow-up action is low. Such people are jocularly referred to as NATO (No Action Talk Only). The reflective leader, in contrast, does a lot of listening, little talk, a lot of reflections on the options and consequences of his actions, followed by a lot of action. This is one of Colonel Marwa's styles. He combines this with diplomacy, a skill he must have learned during his diplomatic posting experience.

Our research showed that Colonel Marwa is always quick to hear and slow to act. He prefers not to take a step than to take one that will fail. This he has demonstrated not only in his reaction to the withdrawal of military men from Operation Sweep, but also in his choice of commissioners. When around October 10, 1997, the Army announced it was withdrawing his men from the security outfit of the state, *Operation Sweep*, there was pandemonium as to how effective and efficient the outfit would henceforth be. All eyes then were raised towards Marwa for explanations. Though Marwa claimed he was not consulted when the Army withdrew its men, he being a diplomat to the core, did not condemn the action publicly despite the fact that he knew the action would no doubt affect the fortunes of the set-up. All he did was to move behind the scene and ensure that those soldiers were returned.

If there is an area where Marwa's tactics is also evident, it is in the way and manner in which he chose his commissioners. Initially, Marwa decided to work with the executive he inherited from his predecessor. They, however, fell apart when his call for financial prudence fell on deaf ears. This made him sack all of them on August 30, 1996. For almost nine months, he governed the state without commissioners. Even though some viewed this act of governing without political advisers as dictatorial, for the administrator, there was nothing wrong in it since administrative procedures were, nonetheless, observed in the award of contracts and other businesses of government.

However, the delay in appointing new Commissioners was tactical. He took his time to pick those who will fit into the socio-economic and political configuration of the time. He did not just choose anybody. Most of the new commissioners were assigned portfolios relating to their professions. For example, Mrs Muyibat Wonuola Abiola Folami a legal practitioner holds the Justice portfolio, Engineer Anthony Babatunde Pinherio the Ministry of Works, Dr. Michael Odukoya Ogungbesan, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Mrs Folake Kafayat Abdul-Rasak, a banker was first assigned to



Finance and Economic Development Ministry (later to the Women Affairs Ministry), Mr. Mufutau Olatunde Animashaun, who has a Master's Degree in Agricultural Science is put in charge of Agriculture Cooperatives and Rural Development; Architect Nosirudeen Alade Kolawole Kekereekun was in charge of the Environment and Physical Planning Ministry before voluntary withdrawal for politics; Mr Philip Olabode Vinuyon Aivoji was first assigned the Information and Culture Ministry before he was moved to Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism. It is this crop of intellectuals that have been offering the Administration invaluable political advice.

***Scooping More Income:*** To meet the goal of satisfying the masses, a leader requires a healthy funding base. Colonel Marwa was committed to making life comfortable for the masses in Lagos, hence, he needed to devise techniques of raising funds, aside from the prudential management of the funds. In pursuance of this technique, Colonel Marwa went ahead to review the tax collection system of the State. He discovered that most of the tax agents hired by the State to collect revenue were not honest and colluded with clients to defraud. To curb this practice, Marwa first of all reduced, drastically, the number of tax agents. Secondly, he directed that all taxes must be paid to designated banks. In addition, tax consultants were recruited to undertake a reassessment of true financial status of companies in the State to be able to determine if they had been paying appropriate taxes. All these efforts raised the State's income. Government's expenditure thereafter witnessed a rise from N9.4 billion in 1996 to N12.8 billion in 1997 and about N16 billion in 1998.

***Fear of Allah:*** Although anchoring our description of Colonel Marwa's tactics of governance, the fear of Almighty Allah in all that he does is the MILAD's No.1 lodestone. A devout Moslem, Colonel Marwa conducts the business of governance with the understanding that the Almighty Allah expects fairness in all dealings and goodness to all men. No malice, no witch-hunting, and no 'magomago'. Not surprisingly, Colonel Marwa advised that coming Governors of Lagos State should govern with the fear of God and the love of the people.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented the findings of our quest into the tactics and strategies of governance adopted by Colonel Mohamed Buba Marwa. We found that he used a variety of strategies of which fourteen were isolated and described. We found also that his tactics and style of governance are embedded in two things. One, his commitment to serve and two, his loyalty to the people. He often ignores the fact that his posting is military and that he has the power to rule by decree. He prefers to explain reasons for government actions, whereas he technically, owes nobody explanations.

Mr. Leo Babarinde Da-Silva, the super-sharp Secretary to the State Government who worked with Colonel Marwa, first as Permanent Secretary, Political and General and General Administration and then as SSG, spent almost an hour talking about the enviable attributes of his boss when asked the simple question: "In one or two sentences, can you tell us about the man Marwa and his tactics of governance?". We close this chapter with quotes from Mr. Da-Silva.

*"You know the man trained in one of the best institutions in the world — Harvard - so, what do you expect? He is polished, refined and he has a kind heart. He does not want anything to tarnish his image so he goes flat out to do his level best to succeed. More importantly for the people of Lagos, he loves the masses and his programmes are people oriented. So, all his strategies and tactics are geared towards achieving the greatest good, for the greatest number of people".*

- 
- i. Otite, O. (1976). On the concept of a Nigeria society. In A. O. Sanda (Ed.) *Ethnic Relations in Nigeria*. Ibadan: The Caxton press (West Africa) Ltd.



- ii. We owe this term to Claude Ake see his book, Ake, C. A. *Political Economy of Africa*, Longman, 1983 p. 44. It means a variety of development carried out in Africa by the Europeans.
- iii. Nwosu, H. N. and Ofoegbu R. (1986) *Introduction to Politics*. Ontosha: Fourth Dimensions Publishers.
- iv. Jinadu L. A. Fanon: *In search of the African Revolution*. Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.
- v. Elaigwu J. I. 'The military and Political Engineering in Nigeria (1966–99): 'An Overview' in Ajayi J. F. Ade and Ikara B. (Ed.) *Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria*. University Press Limited and Kaduna State Council for Arts and Culture, 1985.